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Problems of Proof When There's a Computer

Goof: Consumers Versus ATMs
by MARK BuDNrrz*

INTRODUCTION

Automated teller machines (ATMs) have been the most successful application of electronic banking.' Surveys indicate that
consumers use them primarily because of their convenience. 2 Unfortunately, two types of errors occur in using these machines. Occasionally, an ATM dispenses less cash to the consumer than it
deducts from the consumer's account. 3 Second, a consumer 4may
make a deposit at an ATM which is not credited to his account.
This article discusses the difficulties that consumers will encounter in trying to prove that the bank's computers or employees
made an error in a transaction involving an ATM. The focus is on
presumptions, and the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut these presumptions, if the dispute reaches the trial stage. The
allocation of burden may have a substantial impact on prelitigation
resolution of the dispute as well.
A. B. 1966, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1969, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Bank Card Connects with Kansas ATM, Am.
Banker, June 14, 1979, at 2, col. 1; 2 Biggest Banks in Oregon Order New ATMs Following Long Hiatus,Am. Banker, June 14, 1979, at 12, col. 3.
2. F. Greguras & A. Wright, The Consumer-Financial Institution Relationship in
Electronic Funds Transfer Legislation 64, 65 (Center for Computer/Law, Monograph
No. 1, 1979).
3. Berger, Banking by Computer: Is Your Money Safe?, PARADE, Sept. 17, 1978, at
22, col. 1.
4. Blumenthal, Silent Thefts at Money Machines Raise Legal Issues, N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1978, at D1O, col. 1. Banks increasingly are giving customers at least partial
credit for unverified deposits made through ATMs, according to a recent survey. "In
1976 less than 10% of the surveyed participants allowed credit for unverified deposits.
In the 1979 survey, however, 50% of the institutions allowed some credit for an unverified ATM Deposit, the bulk of them falling in the $100 range, and another 6% said
they would in the future." Gross, New Issues Evolving For A TMs, Am. Banker, Dec.
4, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
*
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The new federal law governing electronic funds transfers applies to ATM withdrawals and deposits. 5 Because that law is silent
on many aspects of the burden question, however, state court decisions on analogous, non-electronic bank transfers provide helpful
models for resolving some of these legal issues. At the most fundamental level, these legal issues raise social policy questions.
Should the legal system facilitate the promotion and marketing
of computer-assisted financial transfers 6 by placing the burden of
going forward with proof of error squarely on the aggrieved consumer?7 Or, should the legal system give the consumer an advantage by establishing a presumption and shifting the burden of proof
to the financial institution once the consumer has presented the limited evidence he has under his control? Though the latter choice
may retard the proliferation of ATMs and result in banks placing restrictions on their use, society's goals should be to favor consumers
over computers.
I.

ATM DEPOSITS

A typical deposit transaction works in the following manner. A
consumer places his checks and/or cash in a deposit envelope and
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et seq. (1978) [hereinafter cited as EFT Act].
6. In the past, the United States has adopted legal doctrines to promote commercial interests. "One of the most striking aspects of legal change during the antebellum period is the extent to which common law doctrines were transformed to
create legal immunities from legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development." M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 100 (1977). When courts set out to
promote commercial interests, or adopt rules which have the effect of promoting
them, they are performing the "social engineering function of balancing the utility of
economically productive activity against the harm that would accrue." Id. at 102.
Computer technology benefits the public, not just the financial institutions using that
technology. But there are also dysfunctions, including the harm to individual consumers when computers fail to perform correctly, and the risk of promoting overinvestment in computer equipment and technology. Before deciding whether or not
to favor the promotion of computer banking over individual consumer rights, the legal
system should determine whether the "social benefits" exceed the "social costs." See
generally id. at 100.
7. Placing the burden of proof on the injured consumer does not necessarily promote electronic banking. If computer errors were rampant, and hundreds of consumers sued but lost, because of the absence of favorable presumptions and the onerous
burden of going forward in presenting evidence, presumably word would get out and
many consumers would stop using ATMs. Under these circumstances, a burden rule
favoring financial institutions would have the effect of retarding the promotion and
marketing of ATMs. But it is doubtful that this will occur. Consumer controversies
rarely proceed as far as trial, which is where the burden rules come into play. Therefore, while individual consumers may lose their cases because of burden rules, these
rules would not dissuade most consumers from using ATMs.

1980]

CONSUMERS VERSUS ATMs

instructs the machine that he is making a deposit. The ATM may
ask the consumer to type in the amount of the deposit and instruct
him to place the envelope into a special feeder which moves it into
the machine and out of the control of the consumer. The ATM then
provides a transaction document as a written record of the deposit.
Though the document provided may include a printed notation of an
amount of money identified as a deposit, this merely reflects what
the consumer has typed into the ATM. The ATM does not count the
money in the deposit envelope. Consequently, an empty envelope
could be fed into the ATM.
A perplexing problem is presented by the consumer who claims
that he made a deposit at an ATM, while the financial institution
claims that it can find no evidence of the deposit. Three possible explanations exist. The consumer may be lying and trying to defraud
the financial institution into crediting his account for a deposit that
he never made; the ATM may have malfunctioned, failing to secure
the deposit envelope, and permitting a subsequent customer to remove it; or the financial institution employee who services the ATM
may have stolen the deposit envelope. The question for the legal
system is which party should bear the burden of proving who is responsible.
A.

Applicability of the EFTAct

The Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) Act provides that any required documentation given to the consumer by a terminal "which
indicates that an electronic transfer was made to another person
shall be admissible as evidence of such transfer and shall constitute
prima facie proof that such transfer was made."8 Before the consumer can take advantage of this evidentiary rule, however, he must
show that the transfer was an electronic funds transfer as defined
by the Act. The law provides, inter alia, that the term means any
transfer of funds, "other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an
electronic terminal ... so as to order, instruct, or authorize a
financial institution to debit or credit an account."9 The definition of
electronic funds transfer includes deposits and withdrawals made at
ATMs.10
One can argue that depositing a check into an ATM is "a trans8. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(f) (1978). Since such a transaction is not an unauthorized
transfer as defined in § 1693a(11), the consumer would not gain the benefit of the
shift of the burden of proof provided in § 1693g(b) for such transactions.
9. Id. § 1693a(6); emphasis added.
10. Id.
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action originated by check" and is therefore outside the definition of
an electronic funds transfer and not covered by the Act. That does
not appear, however, to be a correct construction of the definition.
The exemption of transactions originated by check was intended to
exclude the traditional, routine use of checks in which electronics
may play a role somewhere in the process, but in which no electronic machine, such as an ATM or POS terminal, is used in the initial stages of the transfer.1 1 In addition, the exclusion of ATM check
deposits would have an anomalous result, since cash deposits at
ATMs are clearly included in the Act.
Even if one can safely assume that both check and cash deposits are within the definition, the language of the EFT Act presents
another potential barrier. In order to take advantage of the statute's
prima facie rule, the deposit must be a transfer made to "another
person.' 2 When a consumer makes a deposit to his own account
through an ATM, is this a transfer to another person, to the financial
institution, 13 or a transfer from the consumer to the same personhimself? The consumer may argue that a deposit is technically a
loan made to the financial institution and is not a transfer of money
11. The original Riegle bill, which was the basis for the final EFT Act was S. 2065.
It provided, inter alia,that "the term 'electronic fund transfer' means any transfer of
funds the effectuation of which is dependent in whole or substantial part on electronic means ....
" Id. § 803(5). At Senate hearings on that bill, several witnesses
testified that the definition was too broad, since it would include many routine bank
transactions, including check transactions, in which electronics play an incidental
role. The inclusion of check truncation was objected to by Citicorp. However, inclusion of check deposits at ATMs was not singled out for objection by these witnesses.
Hearingson S. 2065 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1977) (testimony
of J. Frederic Ruf); 309-10 (testimony of David A. Huemen); 357 (testimony of Citicorp.); 375 (testimony of Robert Patrick).
The subsequent legislative history and the statute which was enacted appear to
be responsive to the criticisms expressed at the hearings. Routine check transactions
are excluded by the language exempting transactions originated by check. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693a(6) (1978). The Senate Report states that this exclusion includes check truncation even where the checks are "routed or processed electronically." S. Rep. No. 915,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
However, deposits of checks at ATMs do not appear to be excluded. The Senate
Report specifically mentions the withdrawal and deposit functions of ATMs in justifying the need for EFT legislation. Id. at 2. In explaining the scope of the Act, the Report lists several types of EFT services, including ATMs, stating that they are
included because each "is initiated and carried out primarily by electronic means."
Id. 3. Depositing a check through an ATM is an act which is "initiated and carried
out primarily by electronic means."
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(f) (1978).
13. The Senate Report specifies that a transfer to another person includes a
transfer to the consumer's bank. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 13.
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into the consumer's account. Once the financial institution accepts
the deposit, it is not a bailee of the depositor's money; it has no obligation to keep the depositor's money separate from other funds. Instead, a debtor-creditor relationship is established, since the
depositor has "lent" the deposited funds to the financial institution.
The institution's obligation is to properly credit the amount of the
deposit to the depositor's account, and to pay it out upon the depositor's order. 14 Therefore, when a consumer makes a deposit at an
ATM, it is a transfer to "another person," and not a transfer from
the consumer to himself, though it is credited to his account.
B. Prima Facie Rule
Assuming that the consumer has met these initial criteria, he
can use the document issued at the terminal-the deposit slip-as
prima facie evidence that he made a deposit.' 5 This does not mean,
however, that the consumer will prevail if a dispute arises. For instance, the consumer may not be able to take advantage of the rule
because he lost or threw away the deposit slip,' 6 or the machine
may have malfunctioned and recorded the wrong amount on the deposit slip or failed to furnish the deposit slip.
Even if the consumer has the deposit slip and can use the prima
facie rule, it will not necessarily give him a substantial advantage7
when he brings an action for damages under section 915 of the Act.'
The marginal effect of the prima facie rule is illustrated by cases involving non-EFT deposit transactions where a similar rule also applies. Courts have down-played the significance of the deposit slip,
characterizing it as merely an acknowledgement, a receipt or a
memorandum. 18 Though the slip is prima facie evidence, it creates a
rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive one.' 9 In the ATM situation, it permits the presumption that a deposit was made in the
amount recorded on the deposit slip. 20 However, in most jurisdic14. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 551 (1972).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(f) (1978).
16. Even if the consumer has lost the deposit slip, he may be able to obtain bank
records of the transaction through discovery. If the ATM produces a written record
identical to the deposit slip for the bank, this may be just as good evidence for the
consumer as his deposit slip. However, if a machine malfunction caused erroneous
information to be recorded, the bank's record will be of no help to the consumer. Regardless, the discussion in the text concerns the effectiveness of the EF' Act's prima
facie evidence rule, and is not meant to imply that the consumer might not be able to
produce evidence through other less expeditious and more expensive means.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m (1978).
18.

5B A. MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 227 (1973).

19. Id. at 228.
20. See generally Ash v. Livingston State Bank & Trust Co., 129 So.2d 863, 867 (La.
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tions, the burden of persuasion is still on the consumer. The presumption acts merely to put the burden of production of evidence
on the defendant 21 ; the financial institution must explain or contradict the presumption which the prima facie rule allows.
The courts are then faced with the question of whether the
financial institution has produced sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not specify how
much evidence the defendant must submit to rebut the presump23
tion.22 Consequently, federal courts have discretion in this area.
State courts have adopted several different approaches, ranging
from a minimum amount of credible evidence to a preponderance of
the evidence. 24 Perhaps courts will rule that the financial institution
has met its burden once it has produced evidence that it exercised
stringent procedures, e.g., the ATM was checked for malfunctions
every day and no problems were found; not one but two trusted employees went through the deposit envelopes fed into the ATMs; no
other customers complained about the problem. Until courts have
been confronted with actual cases, it is impossible to know what
type and amount of evidence will be sufficient. It may come down to
little more than the court's judgment on which witnesses seem to be
25
telling the truth, as it often does in non-EFT deposit cases.
C. RelationshipBetween the Consumer and the Bank
Assuming that the consumer cannot prevail merely by asserting
the prima facie rule for any of the several reasons given above, it is
necessary to decide how liability should be determined. First, it is
important to clarify the relationship of the consumer to the financial
institution when he feeds a deposit envelope into the ATM. The crucial issue is, when does a deposit occur? Is a deposit made when the
consumer feeds the envelope into the ATM, or only later when a
Ct. of App. 1961); 5B A. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 228; Abelle, Evidentiary Problems
Relevant to Checks and Computers, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 323 (1976).
21. Federal Rules of Evidence 301 provides that "a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast." State courts have adopted a bewildering variety of
approaches to the problem of presumptions and their effect on burdens. See generally Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions:Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U.L. REv. 527,
554 (1978).
22. See note 21 supra.
23. Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 21, at 554-55.
24. Id. at 546.
25. See, e.g., Ash v. Livingston State Bank & Trust Co., 129 So. 2d 863, 867 (La. Ct.

of App. 1961).
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financial institution employee opens the machine and physically
takes possession of the envelope? If it is the latter, perhaps there is
a bailor-bailee relationship from the time the consumer feeds the
envelope into the ATM until the employee exercises control over the
envelope. In contrast, if a court holds that the financial institution
begins processing the deposit as soon as the envelope is fed into the
machine, there is a debtor-creditor relationship throughout the time
period. This would put the consumer in an advantageous position
since, as a debtor of the consumer, the financial institution would be
under a higher standard of care to safeguard the consumer's money
26
than it would as a bailee.
In cases involving deposits made in a non-EFT mode, courts
have held that a debtor-creditor relationship arises when title to the
money passes to the financial institution. This occurs when the deposit is in the possession of and has been accepted by the institution. 27 But courts have also held that acceptance does not occur
until the money has been counted to determine the amount of the
deposit. 28 A deposit envelope for use in an ATM which says "[a]ll
deposits and payments are subject to proof and verification" seems
to assert the financial institution's right to open the envelope and
examine and count its contents before accepting the deposit. At
least in jurisdictions which follow the line of cases holding that acceptance does not occur until the money is counted, and which
would probably follow the same analysis in ATM deposit cases, consumers will not be able to rely on an assertion of a debtor-creditor
relationship at the time the envelope is fed into the ATM.
D. Bailor-Bailee Relationship:Night Depository Cases
The consumer, however, may derive an advantage even if he can
show only that a bailor-bailee relationship exists. Courts have found
that a bailment for mutual benefit is created in night depository
cases. The night depository is analogous to the ATM deposit situation. In both, the depositor surrenders control of the deposit by putting it into a device operated by the financial institution. In both, no
employee is present to witness the delivery or to take possession of
the deposit at the time of delivery. This is unlike the normal bailment situation where the prospective bailee is present to examine
the property and determine its exact nature and amount before entering into the bailment relationship. The dilemma is the same in
the night depository and ATM deposit situations. The bailee26. See generally 5A A.
27. Id. at 44.
28.

Id.

MICHIE,

supra note 18, at § 100.
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financial institution has no way of proving that the customer did not
make the deposit, except by making the bald assertion that it never
found the deposit when its personnel checked the device. Of course,
the bailor-customer can rely only on his own word that he made the
claimed deposit.
29
The case of Irish & Swartz Stores v. First National Bank illustrates one approach to resolving night depository problems. In that
case, the depository worked in the following manner. When the door
was closed, the tray was supposed to slip the bag into a chute which
led to a vault. A sign above the tray instructed the depositor to reopen the door after putting in the deposit bag to ensure that the bag
had entered the chute.
The trial court instructed the jury that if the depositor did deliver the bag, the law raised a presumption that the failure of the
bank to find the bag in the morning was caused by the bank's negligence. 30 In additional instructions, the court specified that delivery
was proven if the depositor followed the instructions and reopened
31
the door to make sure that the bag actually went into the chute.
The depositor testified that he "couldn't swear" that he reopened
the door to check, but felt sure that he did, since that was his usual
practice. 32 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the bank.
The supreme court of Oregon upheld these instructions, finding
that the depositor must prove that the bag actually entered the
chute and could not be removed by a subsequent customer or
thief. 33 The plaintiff claimed that it was impossible to produce that
kind of evidence. The court answered that it was equally impossible
for the bank to prove that a depositor had not put the bag in the depository, or put it there, but that it failed to reach the vault through
the depositor's, and not the bank's, fault.34 In upholding the instructions despite the onerous burden placed upon depositors, the court
was greatly influenced by the fact that the depositor had agreed to a
contract containing an exculpatory clause which placed the risk of
loss of a deposit bag on the depositor. 35 The court refused to follow
a line of cases striking down these clauses. 36 In those cases the
courts found that banks are professional bailees, and therefore,
must be held to some standard of care regardless of their contracts
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

220
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Or. 362, 349 P.2d 814 (1960).
at 367, 349 P.2d at 817.
at 368, 349 P.2d at 818.
at 369, 349 P.2d at 818.
at 371-72, 349 P.2d at 819.
at 373, 349 P.2d at 820.
at 375, 349 P.2d at 821.

CONSUMERS VERSUS ATMs

1980]

with depositors. 37 The Oregon court found that there had been no
showing that the public's need for night depository services was so
great that banks'38should be subject to what amounted to "almost absolute liability.
In a subsequent decision, the supreme court of Oregon cast
grave doubt upon the validity of exculpatory clauses in night depository cases. 39 Further, clauses of that kind are specifically prohibited
by the EFT Act. 4° It would, therefore, be inappropriate for a court
deciding an ATM case to follow the Irish & Swartz holding insofar
as it was based upon the exculpatory clause.
The Irish & Swartz case was not overruled on the issue of what
constitutes proper delivery, so that part of the opinion may serve as
a model in other states as well. In the ATM situation, a duty comparable to that imposed in Irish & Swartz might require that the consumer not only put the envelope into the receptacle or feeder, but
also check to make sure that the envelope was completely "swallowed" by the feeder so that the next customer could not remove it.
Under the holding in Irish & Swartz, as clarified by the later case of
Real Good Food Stores, 41 if the trier of fact believes that the consumer did this, the burden then falls on the bank.
Unfortunately, such a rule would reduce every case to a "swearing contest," and the credibility of the consumer's story about how
conscientiously he checked to make sure that the envelope was
completely fed into the ATM would become crucial. Under skillful
and harsh cross-examination, most consumers, like the depositor in
Irish & Swartz, would probably admit that they "couldn't swear"
that they rechecked the ATM to make sure that the envelope was
fully "digested."
37. See Dykstra, The Uses of a Bank's Night Depository Facilities,70 BANKING L.J.
21(1953).
38. 220 Or. at 378, 349 P.2d at 822.
39. Real Good Food Stores, Inc. v. First National Bank, 276 Or. 1057, 557 P.2d 654
(1976). In Real Good Food Stores the holding of Irish & Swartz was interpreted as
bearing solely on the issue of when delivery of the deposit takes place. The court asserted that the validity of the exculpatory clause was not even at issue on appeal in
Irish & Swartz. Furthermore, in Real Good Food Stores the court refused to uphold
an exculpatory clause because in that case the bank admitted the deposit had been
delivered. Id. at 1064, 557 P.2d at 658. In addition, the court in Irish & Swartz pointed
out that in the case before it the deposit bag was opened the next business day by
the depositor. If the bag was opened instead by the bank out of the depositor's presence, as is the case with ATM deposits, the court admitted that a "different rule may
be called for. . .

."

220 Or. at 377, 349 P.2d at 822.

40. 15 U.S.C. § 16931 (1978).
41. 276 Or. 1057, 557 P.2d 654 (1976).
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In one night depository case, 42 however, the judge was convinced that the financial institution would lose every time under
such a rule. All the depositor need do is testify that he placed the
bag in the chute. The financial institution is then forced to rely on
circumstancial evidence that it never found the bag. "[T]he cards
would appear to be stacked unfairly against the bank. '4 3 Consequently, though the court refused to enforce a standard exculpatory
clause, it suggested that a reasonable agreement would be one in
which the depositor would have to meet the standard of "clear and
In practice, the court found that this probably
convincing proof."
could be satisfied by the testimony of one witness in addition to the
45
depositor.
In would be unfair and unwise for courts to impose this burden
upon consumers using ATMs. It would be unfair unless consumers
were clearly informed in advance of their duties relative to ensuring
that the envelope was completely delivered, and of the need for a
witness should any dispute arise. But even if consumers were adequately informed through notices at ATMs, such a policy seems unwise because, as the Irish & Swartz case suggests, unsophisticated
consumers may not win "swearing contests" under close cross-examination, and most consumers will not bother to bring along a witness, particularly a disinterested witness, every time they make a
deposit.
If financial institutions believe that consumers stand a slim
chance of succeeding in a lawsuit, they will be less likely to settle
deposit disputes prior to trial. This will frustrate the error resolution procedure of the EFT Act, which is designed to save both parties the time and expense of judicial proceedings. 46 Imposition of
this burden also would force the consumer into making a difficult
choice. The major reason for using the ATM is its convenience. If
the consumer must take proper precautions should a dispute arise,
he will have to forego much of this convenience. The problem will
become more severe if financial institutions limit their regular business hours and close branches so that consumers have to rely more
on ATMs. 47 The energy shortage may also make banks increasingly
inaccessible and ATMs ever more convenient.
If financial institutions are really worried about large-scale
42. Gramore Stores, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 402 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1978).
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id.
45. Id
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (1978).
47. See generally Budnitz, The Impact of EFT Upon Consumers: Practical
Problems Faced by Consumers, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 361, 388-90 (1979).
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fraud perpetrated by consumers falsely alleging that they made deposits, they can take steps to reduce their losses by limiting the
amount of deposits that will be accepted at an ATM within a stated
period of time. However, this will make the service less convenient,
and may result in a loss of business. The institution can also refuse
to continue offering ATM services to a consumer if the financial institution is convinced that the consumer is making false claims
about deposits.
In addition to these reasons, tilting the burden of proof in favor
of the consumer can be justified because of the financial institution's
special position in society and the manner in which it is marketing
ATM services. In striking down exculpatory clauses in night depository contracts, courts have characterized banks as "professional
bailees."'
"[B]anking is an essential service upon which the public
is required to rely and the night depository facility of a bank is an
integral party of the business of banking. '49 Similarly, financial institutions provide essential services to consumers. The use of ATMs
has become so widespread and is such an important part of consumer banking that Congress found a need for federal legislation to
regulate ATMs. 50 At many banks the ATM is already an integral
part of providing financial services.
In Irish & Swartz, the court resisted imposing a heavy burden
upon banks unless it could be shown that there was a great public
need for night depository services.5 ' That standard is misdirected in
the ATM context. It is more appropriate to look at the promotional
focus of financial institutions to see if they are offering ATMs as an
integral part of their package of consumer banking services, and
whether their marketing practices are directed toward creating the
perception in the mind of the consumer that ATMs are a public
need.
Advertisements illustrate both of these aspects. For example, a
three-quarter page ad in the largest circulation Boston daily newspaper acknowledged that the ATM had become an integral part of
the consumer package by informing customers that their Master
Charge and Visa cards could be used to access the ATM, as well as
the card originally distributed exclusively for that purpose.5 2 In this
way, the ATM was directly linked to the consumer's credit account
48. See, e.g., Real Good Food Stores, Inc., v. First National Bank, 276 Or. 1057, 557
P.2d 654 (1976).
49. Gramore Stores, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 402 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (1978).
50. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2.
51. Irish & Swartz Stores v. First National Bank, 220 Or. 362, 378, 349 P.2d 814, 822
(1960).
52. The Boston Globe, May 22, 1979, at 12, col. 2.
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as well as his checking account. The advertisement suggested that
consumers really needed ATMs:
Because of course the real beauty of X-Press 24 is that regardless of
what day or what time of day, instant cash is always ready and
waiting.
Just think
No more rushing to get to the bank before it closes.
No more "Who can we get to cash a check?" late at night or on
Sundays.
No more "We can't leave until the bank opens in the morning"
when you're going on a trip.
53
No more gearing your life around your bank's hours.
It is appropriate for courts to shift the burden of proof to the
financial institution once the consumer has presented a prima facie
case, with or without a terminal document, since (1) consumers will
have difficulty proving that ATMs properly accepted their deposit
envelopes, (2) financial institutions provide essential services, (3)
ATM deposits are an integral part of those services, and (4) ATMs
are being promoted as fulfilling a public need. That is, once the consumer testifies that he made the deposit, provides the details of
time, place, kind and amount of deposit, and offers the deposit slip,
if available, into evidence, the burden should shift to the financial
institution to overcome the presumption that it is responsible for
any losses that occurred due to its failure to credit the deposit to the
consumer's account.
II. ATM WrrHDRAwALS
A second type of computer malfunction occurs when the cash
dispenser on an ATM fails to provide the consumer with the amount
of cash that he requested. For example, a consumer instructs the
ATM to withdraw $100 from his account, the terminal spits out a slip
indicating that $100 has been withdrawn, the subsequent periodic
statement shows that $100 was debited from the account, but, when
the consumer takes the money out of the dispenser, he finds only

$50.
If the consumer retains the terminal document, it will serve as
prima facie evidence that he did engage in the disputed transaction.54 However, the document will not help him prove that he received only $50. As in the deposit situation, the question arises as to
whether there should be a presumption in favor of the consumer,
and who should bear the burden of going forward. Once the con53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(f) (1978).
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sumer has presented evidence that he engaged in the transaction by
submitting the terminal and/or periodic statement, and that his account was debited $100, and testifies that he only received $50,
should a presumption arise that the bank failed to fulfill its responsibilities by providing less than the amount debited from the account?5 5 The EFT Act does not address this issue. Such a
presumption obviously imposes a heavy burden on the financial institution. In evaluating whether it is an appropriate one, it is relevant to examine the relationship between a consumer and a
financial institution when a withdrawal is made.
A.

Relationship Between the Bank and Consumer: Debtor and
Creditor

When a withdrawal is made through an ATM, a debtor-creditor
relationship clearly exists. As the debtor, the financial institution is
obligated to debit the consumer-creditor's account and transfer the
funds according to the consumer's instructions.5 6 The courts' characterization of the relationship as debtor-creditor obviously contemplates that the consumer is entitled to certain benefits and
advantages. The financial institution accepts its inferior status as a
debtor and is amply rewarded by obtaining the funds it needs to
carry out its business. It is consistent with the debtor-creditor relationship extant at the time of the withdrawal to tip the scales in
favor of the consumer and impose a heavier burden on the financial
institution when an ATM dispute occurs.
Traditional banking law cases illustrate some of the implications
of the debtor-creditor relationship. The general rule is that once the
consumer makes a deposit which is accepted by the bank, the bank
becomes liable for that amount as a debt. This debt can be discharged only by payment in accordance with the customer's order.
"The bank assumes the duty of seeing that it is so paid. If it pays
out the money otherwise, it is liable to the depositor for the amount
of such payment. 5 7 One court has imposed what it characterized as
a "high standard" on banks paying money from a depositor's ac58
count.
Some case law imposes an obligation, not only to use due care
and diligence, but to use "active vigilance" in paying out a deposi55. This presumption is analogous to that used by the trial court in Irish & Swartz
v. First National Bank, 220 Or. 362, 349 P.2d 814 (1960).
56. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 551.
57. SA A. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 273.
58. Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. National City Bank, 285 App. Div. 182, 136
N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (1954).
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tor's money.5 9 One case has held that the depositor was not required to anticipate that the bank would make withdrawals
negligently and was under no obligation to examine his passbook to
ensure that the bank was not being negligent. 60 Courts have declared a bank responsible for lost or stolen deposits, even if it was
not negligent. 6 1 A Texas court noted that a deposit is a loan made
by the depositor to the bank, not a bailment, and held that the bank
is liable for it "absolutely," no matter how it was lost. 6 2 In light of
these cases, it is not inconsistent with traditional banking law to impose a high standard of care and a somewhat onerous burden upon
a financial institution when a claim is made that it paid out money
erroneously in an ATM transaction.
Admittedly, the ATM cases can be distinguished from these
cases in certain respects. In the non-EFT cases, there is no question
that money has been paid out of the account contrary to the customer's orders, and there is no suggestion that the customer is in
any way involved. In the ATM withdrawal situation, on the other
hand, the consumer may be dishonest, falsely alleging that the ATM
did not pay the money exactly as ordered. The issue is whether
these factors justify a substantial retreat from the bank's traditional
responsibility as a debtor in the withdrawal context.
B. Allocation of Burden
If withdrawals at ATMs cannot be made without the risk of consumer fraud, financial institutions should either stop using ATMs
for withdrawals, or bear any losses. To make the innocent consumer
bear the loss by imposing too heavy a burden on him substantially
weakens the bank's traditional responsibility. It seems unjust to
burden the consumer with the loss for two reasons. First, it has the
effect of presuming that the consumer is the one at fault, rather than
the bank or its machines. Second, the consumer never agreed or
even realized that his traditional, superior position as a creditor in
the withdrawal situation would be substantially eviscerated if he
made the withdrawal via an ATM, rather than by using a human
teller.
Placing the burden on the financial institution is also consistent
with the general policy of placing it on the party who has superior
access to the evidence which is needed to prove or disprove the
59.
60.
61.
62.

5A A. MICmE, supra note 18, at 275-76.
Dow v. Stockport Savings Bank, 202 Ia. 594, 602, 210 N.W. 815, 818 (1926).
5A A. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 278.
Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 245, 248 (1860).
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case. 63 Once the consumer has offered evidence that he engaged in
the transaction, that his account was debited $100, but that he received only $50, there is no further evidence that he can produce.
All additional evidence, if any, is under the control and possession
of the financial institution. Through extensive and expensive discovery, the consumer may be able to learn enough about the mechanics
of the computer's operation, the accuracy and reliability of the particular computer used by the institution, the financial institution's
employees' role, and the interrelationships between the computers
and employees, to discover evidence that it was technically possible
for a human or computer error to have caused the cash dispenser to
proffer the wrong amount.64 But such cases will rarely involve
enough money to justify retaining a lawyer to settle such a case
short of litigation, much less to pay a lawyer to file a lawsuit and engage in discovery of the required magnitude and complexity.
Furthermore, for all but those attorneys with experience in
these types of cases, such discovery is bound to be inefficient, with
many inappropriate avenues explored and questions asked. In
those cases which do result in a lawsuit, it would seem far more reasonable to require the financial institution to assemble the required
information in order to overcome a presumption that it was at fault.
C.

Use of the EFT Act's ErrorResolution Procedure

Placing the burden on the financial institution will also encourage settlement of consumer disputes prior to litigation through
the use of the error resolution procedure contained in the EFT

Act. 65 Because withdrawal disputes will usually not involve large

sums of money, most consumers probably will initially attempt to
resolve disputes by invoking this procedure, since it does not require retention of an attorney or undue time and expense. If the
financial institution knows that a successful consumer lawsuit is unlikely because the onerous burden and absence of favorable presumptions will make such an action too expensive to institute or too
difficult to win, the institution will have no incentive to attempt to
settle the dispute in the consumer's favor. If the institution refuses
to settle, as a practical matter, the consumer has no further redress.
Shifting the burden to the financial institution makes a successful
consumer lawsuit far more likely, and should provide the necessary
incentive for institutions to offer fair settlement under the error resolution procedure to avoid litigation.
63. W. LEACH & P. LIAcos, HANDBOOK OF MASS. EVIDENCE 44 (1967).

64. See generally Abelle, supra note 20, at 372-74.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (1978).
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To comply with the EFT Act's error resolution procedure when
a consumer complains about withdrawal problems, and to protect itself from potential treble damage claims, the financial institution
should be collecting much of the evidence it would need to collect in
order to carry its burden of proof if litigation eventually ensued.
Under the EFT Act the institution must resolve the consumer's dispute within ten days. 66 If the institution needs more time to investigate, it must provisionally recredit the consumer's account so that
the consumer has full use of the disputed funds until the institution
completes its investigation. 67 To ensure fair and complete investigations of consumer disputes, the EFT Act provides that the consumer
is entitled to treble damages if the institution fails to provisionally
recredit the consumer's account within ten days and (1) did not
make a good faith investigation of the alleged error, or (2) did not
have a reasonable basis for believing that the consumer's account
was not in error.68 The treble damage provision also applies if the
financial institution "knowingly and willfully" concluded that the
consumer's account was not in error when such conclusion could
not reasonably have been drawn from the evidence available during
69
its investigation of the alleged error.
Shifting the burden to the financial institution should not cause
undue inconvenience. Not only does the institution have possession
and control of the evidence, but it already will have or should have
gathered the evidence necessary to carry its burden in the course of
complying with the error resolution procedure of the EFT Act.
If it is not possible for the financial institution to produce evidence to rebut the presumption that it was at fault, then arguably it
deserves the resulting liability for unleashing computers which dispense money under circumstances where even the persons who
control the computers cannot prove whether or not they are working
correctly.
III.

CONCLUSION

The use of computers in consumer transactions with financial
institutions creates many new problems. The problems are not confined to situations in which computers make mistakes. The use of
computers creates circumstances in which it is nearly impossible for
a court to know whether a mistake occurred, as when a consumer
claims that the cash dispenser disbursed the wrong amount. Situa66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. § 1693f(a).
Id. § 1693f(c).
Id. § 1693f(e).
Id.
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tions also occur where it is possible that (1) no mistake occurred
and the consumer is lying, (2) the computer made a mistake, or (3)
the computer made no mistake, but its use provided the opportunity
for a thief, either a financial institution employee or a stranger, to
steal the consumer's money. Deposits at ATMs illustrate this dilemma.
The legal system must determine how to allocate the risks
under these circumstances. One of the most crucial aspects of this
allocation occurs during trial in placing burdens of proof and creating presumptions. In analyzing the problems, one may learn from
traditional banking laws and analogous banking transactions.
Courts must also be careful that their decisions are consistent with
the EFT Act.7 0 When all is said and done, it comes down to a basic
value judgment: should the law favor those who control the com71
puters, or those who are cajoled into using them?

70. See, e.g., id. § 1693d(f) (documentation shall constitute prima facie evidence
of a transfer); id. § 1693f (error resolution procedure).
71. See Budnitz, supra note 47, at 364-66.

